As voters switch political preferences from election to election, understanding the magnitude of voter flows among parties and transitions between voters and non-voters is an essential element of political analysis. As exit polls are uncommon in Canada, voter migration can also be estimated using suitable statistical techniques. Backing out micro-level voter migration probabilities from macro-level election data is a problem of 'ecological inference.' This paper uses the method of generalized maximum entropy (GME) to estimate voter migration patterns for the two most recent recent Canadian federal elections (2004 and 2006) and the most recent provincial election in British Columbia (2005). The estimation results answer important questions about voter behaviour in Canada. These results will be of interest to political scientists, historians, and politicians, as well as econometric practicioners who wish to estimate voter migration.
Introduction
Comparing popular vote results between two consecutive elections provides a rather incomplete picture of the underlying electoral dynamics. Whereas aggregate vote results only show parties' net gains and losses, the extent to which voters switch preferences is difficult to capture empirically. Preference switches can be captured either through sampling (exit polls) or by applying econometric techniques 1 to macro-level voter data. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usability of new econometric techniques to estimating the micro-level migration of voters among parties. As is demonstrated using the example of three recent elections in Canada, this methodology has the ability to answer a series of pertinent questions about electoral dynamics.
What are the kind of questions that can be answered by learning about voter migration patterns? Political parties (and the interested public) may wish to know about the composition of the net gains (or losses) observed in an election. Conventionally, such decompositions are only readily available along the geographic dimensions of electoral districts and regions. However, how do voter flows disaggregate into cross-party preference changes, and into voter/non-voter transitions? How do party mergers affect voter preferences? Which parties attract the most new (first-time) voters? For historians and political scientists, estimates of voter migration may also shed light on particular patterns of voter behaviour or the dynamics of the electorate over time.
Analyzing voter migration is a problem of "ecological inference" -the process of using aggregate (historically called "ecological") data to draw conclusions about individual-level behaviour when no individual-level data are available (Schuessler 1999) . When only aggregate voter behaviour is observed between two consecutive elections, many different voter migration patterns can generate the same observation of net gains or losses at the aggregate level. When such micro-level voter migration patterns cannot be measured directly (for example through exit polls), these voter migration patterns need to be inferred from macro-level data using appropriate statistical methods.
Exit polls-conducted as voters leave polling stations-are not widely used in Canada. As interviewers ask voters whom they have voted during a current and a previous election, such polling data could be used in principle to estimate voter migration patterns.
2 Emery (1994, p. 11 ) reports various con-1 By convention I use the term "econometrics" rather than "polimetrics." The latter is obviously more appropriate, but the relevant literature is rooted in econometrics.
2 Despite the paucity of exit polls, there is a wide array of election studies, some involving rolling samples of eligible voters prior to the election, as well as pre-election and post-election questionnaires. Such studies are conducted, for example, by the Canadian Election Study research project jointly undertaken by the Université de Montréal, McGill cerns about the use of exit polls in Canada such as advance reporting and survey standards. Furthermore, exit polls are costly and operationally challenging because of Canada's constituency-based electoral system. The most serious shortcoming of exit polls is their failure to account for the behaviour of non-voters.
In the absence of survey data, voter migration patterns can be inferred from aggregate data using appropriate statistical techniques. One empirical method that has been used for a number of European elections is based on logit equations (Thomsen 1987 (Thomsen , 2001 ). The limitations of applying conventional estimation techniques to the voter migration problem are readily apparent. A useful illustration of these limitations is the work of Sperber (1997), who applies both linear and logistic regression techniques to historical elections in late-19th century Germany. Alternative methods for solving the ecological inference problem were proposed by King (1997) and updated in King et al., eds (2004) , with related software described in King (2004) . However, King's method does not work well for voter transition probability problems (Park 2004) . A survey by the Swiss statistical office (Ambühl 2003) compares several of these alternative conventional estimation strategies based on aggregate data. It emerges that conventional estimators exhibit a variety of problems. For example, multinomial logit or probit suffer from the need to choose a reference party, and they make specific distributional assumptions.
The analytical method proposed in this paper is known as Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME). Compared to alternative estimators, GME offers a number of desirable statistical properties. The principle of maximum entropy is the foundation for an estimation methodology that is characterized by its robustness to ill-conditioned designs and its ability to fit overparametrized models such as those related to ecological inference problems. In comparison to estimators such as maximum likelihood, the GME estimator does not require explicit assumptions about the distribution (i.e., normality) of the error term. Furthermore, in the presence of high degrees of multicollinearity, linear estimators may not be estimable or have high variances. GME can be viewed as a procedure to select among probability distributions so as to choose the distribution that maximizes the uniformity remaining in the distribution, subject to information already known about the distribution. With GME it is possible to provide explicit discrete support points for parameters and errors. In a variant of GME, known as Generalized Cross Entropy (GCE), it is also possible to provide explicit priors for the parameters.
The GME estimator has not been widely used to analyze voter migration patterns, with some notable exceptions. Johnston and Hay (1983) were first in using entropy maximization to estimate voter transition probability probUniversity, and the University of Toronto. abilities in the context of UK elections. A further application is Johnston and Pattie (2000) . Park (2004) has estimated voter transition probabilities in the U.S. A more general treatment of GME in the context of elections appears in Judge et al. (2004) . In recent years, the theoretical understanding of the GME estimator has made considerable progress. Use of the GME estimator is now becoming more readily available as statistical software packages provide corresponding functionality; see for example SAS Institute (2004) . Application of the GME estimator to election studies remains scarce, however, and it is entirely absent in the context of Canadian election studies. This paper attempts to fill this void.
While estimating voter migration can shed light a powerful light on the temporal dynamics of voter behaviour, such estimates are unable to explain voter preferences. However, estimating voter migration can complement other empirical work on voter behaviour in Canada. For example, Cutler (2002) studies how socio-demographic proximity between electors and elected can explain voting preferences. Other studies, such as Carmichael (1990) and Johnston (1999) , focus on party-specific characteristics, incumbency, and states of the economy in order to explain voting preferences. Estimates of voter migration can complement such studies by bridging the analytic gap between micro-level and macro-level voting behaviour and focusing on the temporal dimension of voting behaviour.
The GME approach to voter migration generates important insights into Canadian voter dynamics. It is able to explain, for example, how the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative Party resulted in dislodging voter preferences particularly among the voters of the Progressive Conservative Party in Ontario, which lost a significant share of voters (about 30%) to the Liberal Party. Another key insight gained from application of the GME approach is gauging the importance of non-voters. In the B.C. 2005 election, roughly 45% of votes that the B.C. Liberal Party lost went to non-votes rather than other parties. Yet another valuable inisght gained from the GME approach is the calculation of voter volatility, the ratio of inflows and outflows relative to the 'core' support of a party.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the GME estimator and its application to the voter migration (inverse Markov) problem. Section 3 outlines a number of issues and caveats with election data. The GME estimator is then applied to three Canadian elections (one provincial, two federal). The corresponding estimates of voter migration are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Model
The estimation of voter migration utilizes a method known as "maximum entropy," a statistical framework that utilizes a concept of uncertainty based in information theory. By comparison, the more familiar method of "maximum likelihood" utilizes a concept of uncertainty based in probability theory. The maximum entropy principle is said to "model all that is known and assumes nothing about that which is unknown"-which in practice means that maximum entropy estimators try to find the most uniform estimates subject to the imposed constraints and available information. The maximum entropy estimate is the least biased estimate possible on the given information, which implies that it is maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information. The generalized maximum entropy (GME) estimator generalizes the maximum entropy principle by allowing for individual noisy observations. Maximum entropy estimators are characterized by their robustness to ill-conditioned designs and their ability to fit overparametrized models. Estimates tend to be biased but will typically portray smaller variances than OLS counterparts, making them more desirable from a mean squared error viewpoint. For a discussion of GME estimators see Golan et al. (1996) and Mittelhammer et al. (2000) . The GME estimator is particularly suited for estimating a Markov transition matrix containing voter migration probabilities from multiple constituencies, thus allowing for measurement error. The exposition below follows Judge et al. (2004) loosely.
To begin with, consider the ecological inference problem for a single constituency. Consider two consecutive elections held in n constituencies with m choices (parties or abstention). For expositional simplicity assume that the number of choices remains the same across elections. Then let x ij and y ij denote the fraction of votes for choice j in constituency i so that j x ij = 1. We are interested in estimating the (m × m) Markov transition matrix p i with elements p i,jk , the probability that a voter who has voted for party j in the last election will be voting for party k in the current election. For an individual constituency p i is underidentified. There are m observations but m 2 transition probabilities. Noting the adding-up constraints on the probabilities, there are m 2 − m arbitrary parameters. To recover the transition probabilities, applying the ME principle to this pure Markov inverse problem requires maximizing
subject to the available information
as well as the adding-up constraints ∀i∀j :
and the non-negativity constraints
In the presence of noisy observations, the GME estimation provides for a reparametrization of the errors in a regression equation by specifying a support for the estimates and errors. Using symmetric bounds −µ ik and +µ ik and probability v ik ∈ [0, 1], a given error term ik can be rewritten as
Similarly, support points z jk1 and z jk2 can be defined to rewrite the transition probability p jk (identical across constituencies) as
with probability w jk ∈ [0, 1]. If support points are chosen as z jk1 = 0 and z ijk2 = 1, then the GME estimator maximizes
subject to ∀i∀k :
as well as the Markov matrix adding-up constraints (3) and non-negativity constraints (4). Note that there are nm observations and m 2 + nm parameters. GME estimates are asymptotically normally distributed, permitting the use of conventional parametric tests for statistical significance. Judge et al. (2004) provide a more detailed discussion of this estimator and define suitable support points µ jk for the error bounds. They also propose refinements of the estimator by narrowing the support range [z ik1 , z ik2 ], and they provide further theoretical underpinnings of the GME estimator as a type of expected maximum-likelihood estimator.
Data Issues
Two consecutive elections define a temporal dimension, and electoral districts define a spatial dimension. Both dimensions pose unique problems when trying to estimate voter transition probabilities. In addition, the electoral process itself adds layers of complexity. This section addresses the key empirical challenges.
Population Changes
Consecutive elections are typically years apart. Consequently, the set of eligible voters in one election is not identical to the set of eligible voters in the following election due to inflows and outflows. For a given electoral district, the inflow consists of young citizens who have just reached the voting age, new citizens (naturalized immigrants), and citizens who have migrated between districts. Outflows consist of citizens who have moved to other districts, emigrated, or have passed away.
The change in the number of eligible voters complicates the interpretation of transition probabilities. Transition probabilities are thought of as a voter's likelihood of changing from one electoral preference to another electoral preference from one election to another. However, this notion does not apply to people who are eligible to vote for the first time, or people who are not eligible to vote again. If the proportion of such voters is relatively small, the conceptualization problem may be considered negligible. However, in those districts where population turnover is large as a percentage of the total population, the model needs to be amended to explicitly represent the inflow and outflow groups, and thus the transition probabilities in and out of these groups.
3 Concretely, one can treat the inflow and outflow groups as separate states in the Markov matrix. It may be more expedient, however, to treat the net population change simply as part of the non-voter group.
Non-Voters
Participation rates in Canadian federal elections have historically hovered around 60-70% and have trended downwards in the last decades (Johnston 2000) . This implies that about 30-40% of eligible voters do not vote. Empirically, the group of non-voters splits into registered and non-registered voters. The share of registered voters is determined by the registration process, which itself is subject to change over time. As a result, time trends in the share of non-registered voters are only informative to the extent that the registration procedure has remained unchanged. In practice, voter registration may be automatic (due to filing a tax return, for example) or may require individual application. For analyzing voter behaviour it may thus be more practical to treat the group of non-voters as a single block rather than two depending on their registration status. To infer the number of non-voters it is necessary to obtain an estimate of the number of eligible voters in each constituency. This estimate is typically derived through ex-trapolations from census data. While the number of actual voters is known with certainty, the number of non-voters contains a degree of inaccuracy due to its computation as the difference between the estimated number of eligible voters and the total number of actual voters.
Regional Disparities
The most significant challenge to estimating voter migration probabilities is the heterogeneity of the migration matrices across constituencies. The importance of this problem has been recognized in Johnston and Hay (1983) and other studies. Researchers are faced with a problematic choice, however. On one hand, imposing uniformity (i.e., 'uniform swing' between parties across a set of constituencies) improves the accuracy of voter flow estimates by exploiting information from multiple constituencies. This is the classical sample size problem. On the other hand, imposing uniformity introduces inaccuracies if transition probabilities genuinely differ across constituencies. There is thus an empirical trade-off. A compromise is to divide the constituencies into regions that exhibit similar characteristics. Geographic regions often exhibit high spatial correlation in voter behaviour, and thus the simplest method is to divide the country into suitable (large) geographic regions. For the analysis of the Canadian data, the method used in this paper is to divide constituencies into four regions (Ontario, Quebec, Atlantic, and West), estimate voter transition probabilities for each region, and aggregate them back into overall voter flows. 4 The spatial heterogeneity of voter behaviour remains a key challenge to estimating voter transition probabilities accurately. As is discussed in Anselin and Cho (2002) , spatial autocorrelation poses unique problems with respect to the ecological inference problem. By imposing a particular 'spatial regime' in the form of uniformity within region but not across region, the delineation of regions becomes a critical issue. Anselin and Cho (2002, p. 284) argue that, ideally, the delineation and regime estimation should be carried out jointly. At present this exceeds the ability of estimation tools such as the GME estimator discussed above, and thus the spatial correlation problem remains a topic for further research.
Incumbency
The estimation of voter transition probabilities does not introduce explanatory variables into the model. While estimating voter flows may reveal dynamics of voter behaviour, ultimately the researcher may wish to explain the reasons for changes in voter behaviour. Introducing explanatory variables into a model of voter migration is conceptually possible. In order to retain the Markov structure of the model, explanatory variables become instrumental variables. For example, one particularly well-established feature of voter behaviour is incumbency bias. Introducing an incumbency indicator as an instrumental variable on which the Markov matrix is conditioned would presumably improve estimation accuracy. The development of an instrumental variable Markov-GME estimator is outside the scope of this paper, however.
Redistricting
In estimating voter migration probabilities, the unit of analysis is a constituency. However, the geographic definition of constituencies may change from election to election through redistricting. Specifically, in Canada the representation in the House of Commons is readjusted after each decennial (10-year) census to reflect changes and movements in Canada's population, in accordance with the Constitution Act and the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act. Following the 2001 census, redistricting took place in August 2003. This increased the number of constituencies from 301 to 308 and changed the names of numerous constituencies. The Canada Elections Act mandates a transposition process that determines the number of votes that each registered political party at the last general election would have obtained if voting had taken place in the newly-defined constituencies. 5 Transposition of votes is possible because votes are recorded at the level of polling stations, whose geographic boundaries are known. Transposition thus involves reallocating results from polling stations across constituencies. Elections Canada makes the transition matrix available upon request. It has been used to project the 2000 votes into the 2004 electoral districts.
Results

The B.C. Provincial Election in May 2005
The May 17, 2005 election to the 38th British Columbia Legislative Assembly was combined with a referendum on a proposed change to the electoral system, BC-STV. 6 In 2001, the B.C. Liberal Party had won a landslide victory that resulted in an unprecedented 77 out of 79 seats in the Legislative Assembly. Table 1 7 Table 3 shows the estimated voter flows (expressed in thousands of voters), and the three colour charts in Figure 1 visualize the estimates. Table 3 reveals that the B.C. Liberal Party lost more voters to the non-voter group than it gained from it. The net loss is about 58,000 votes. By comparison, the NDP gained roughly 108,000 votes from the Liberals and 208,000, almost twice as many, from the group of non-voters. The NDP also had net gains of 50,000 votes from the Green Party. Table 3 also suggests a measure of party-specific voter volatility, namely the absolute value of all inflows and outflows relative to the core support (i.e., the diagonal elements in the matrix). Let F ij ≥ 0 denote the gross flow of voters from party i to party j. Then the voter volatility measure VV i for party i is given by
The results indicate that voter support for the NDP is markedly more volatile than support for the Liberals, and voter support for the Green Party is particularly volatile. The volatility of the NDP vote is consistent with the significant unpopularity of the NDP in 2001, when the party was polling in the single digits going into the election. The above analysis suggests that many traditional NDP supporters apparently abstained rather than voting for another party.
The Canadian Federal Election in June 2004
The Table 5 shows consolidated estimates of voter gains and losses. Figure 2 visualizes the voter flows for the Liberal Party, the Bloc Québecois, the New Democratic Party, the (new) Conservative Party of Canada, the Canadian Alliance, and the (old) Progressive Conservative Party. In what follows the focus will be on the regions other than Quebec. A special section below is devoted to the unique electoral dynamics of Quebec.
The merger of the two conservative parties revealed some significant regional differences. In Western Canada, most of the previous Canadian Alliance voters turned towards the new Conservative Party (70%), but this share was significantly larger in Ontario (84%) and significantly smaller in Atlantic Canada (40%). This suggests that support for the Alliance was fragile in Atlantic Canada. Nevertheless, in Western Canada, where the Alliance had its roots, a significant portion (13%) of Alliance voters abstained. The lower retention rate in its core region suggests that some of its voters may have disliked the political direction of the new Conservative Party, fearing a drift to the political centre. Both in Ontario and Western Canada about 6% of Alliance voters drifted towards fringe parties.
The conservative merger had a more complex effect on voters who had supported the old Progressive Conservative Party. In Ontario and Atlantic Canada, most (about 56%) migrated to the new Conservative Party, but only about 36% in Western Canada. About 20% of its voters turned towards the Liberals, but this share was markedly higher in Ontario (30%). The picture that emerges is that the new Conservative Party was not able to attract full support from the old Progressive Party, and in particular in Ontario, which provides one-third of the seats in the House of Commons, there were significant losses to the Liberals. The merger had been proposed as a recipe to unite the right-of-centre vote in Ontario and avoid three-way races in this province that would favour Liberal or NDP candidates. Whereas the combined vote of the two old parties amounted to 38.1% in Ontario in the 2000 election, the new Conservative Party won only 31.5% in the 2004 election. While the new party increased its number of seats from 2 to 24 in Ontario, it probably did not meet the expectations of the benefits of the merger. While the election outcome in Ontario was particularly important because of the high number of 'marginal' seats (i.e., constitutencies with close races), the fact that the vote for the Progressive Conservative Party fractured in Western Canada did not have a significant impact on the seats distribution. In Western Canada about a third of the Progressive Conservative vote turned towards other parties or abstentions.
As for the Liberal Party, its key weakness in the 2004 election was not that other parties had become considerably more attractive, but that the Liberals themselves had become less attractive. This pattern becomes apparent when considering that statistically significant losses occurred only towards the group of non-voters but not any of the other parties. Voter dissatisfaction with the Liberals was most pronounced in Atlantic Canada and Quebec (24% migration to non-voters), and somewhat less pronounced in Western Canada and Ontario (15% and 13%, respectively). The party's net loss to the group of non-voters amounted to roughly 430,000 votes. Overall, the party's core support of repeat voters was strongest in Ontario (72%) and weakest in the West (57%).
The estimates of voter migration reveal that core support for the New Democratic Party was strongest in Ontario (71%), but considerably weaker in Western Canada (47%) and Atlantic Canada (53%). However, the NDP attracted the largest number of new voters. The party attracted some 700,000 new voters from the group of non-voters, for a net gain of about 500,000-or more than the Liberals net loss to that group of non-voters. Given the party's profile, these may have well been mostly young (first-time) voters.
The June 2004 election and the resulting minority government set the stage for the January 2006 election, just nineteen months later.
The Canadian Federal Election in January 2006
Like the previous election, the 38th General Election to the House of Commons, held on January 23, 2006, did not produce a clear majority. The Conservatives won 124 seats (a gain of 25 seats) while the Liberals won 103 seats (a loss of 23 seats). As the strongest party, the Conservatives formed the new government under prime minister Stephen Harper. An important factor in the lead-up to the election was the 'federal sponsorship scandal,' named after a government sponsorship program in Quebec that was found to have been subject to misuse of public funds by an Auditor General report. A subsequent inquiry led by the Gomery Commission kept the issue in the eyes of the public during the election campaign.
The general expectation prior to the election was that the Liberals would lose seats to the Conservatives. In the month before the election, polls hinted at the possibility of a Conservative majority. One of the key questions in terms of electoral dynamics was the extent to which the Conservative Party would be able to gain seats in Ontario, and to some extent in Que- The voter flow estimates show a consolidation of the Conservative Party in Ontario and Western Canada. There the party has high retention rates (90% and 84%, respectively) and virtually no losses directly towards the Liberals. Only in Atlantic Canada the own retention rate remains low (56%). Losses were primarily towards the group of non-voters. Whereas the Liberal Party managed to attract new voters in Ontario, new voters turned out in large numbers for the Conservative Party in Western Canada (13%) and Atlantic Canada (21%). The Conservatives also managed to siphon off votes from mostly right-of-centre fringe parties (23% of the vote of other parties).
Compared to the previous election, the New Democratic Party's vote had solidified in the 2006 election, particularly in Ontario. With a 91% retention rate and little in-migration and out-migration the party's vote was essentially stable. The picture is different in other provinces. In Western Canada the party attracted voters from the group of 'all other parties', which contains a large segment of voters of the Green Party, which has traditionally been stronger in British Columbia than in other provinces. In Atlantic Canada the New Democrats suffered a setback by retaining only 58% of its previous voters and losing some 25% to abstentions. Overall, the New Democrats' position appears much less solid in Atlantic Canada (and Quebec) than further west.
Voter Migration in Quebec in the 2004 and 2006 Federal Elections
The political landscape of Quebec differs significantly from that of the rest of Canada, which merits treating these results separately. The uniqueness of Quebec politics is characterized by the existence of a separatist party, the Bloc Québecois, which only fields candidates in Quebec ridings and promotes the separatist cause at the federal level.
Tables 13 and 14 provide GME estimates of voter migration in Quebec during the 2000 and 2004 federal elections. What is striking in the 2004 election is the high retention rate of 92% of own previous voters of the Bloc Québecois. In that election the vote for the Bloc was apparently self contained with little loss to any other party or to non-voters. Due to the merger with the Canadian Alliance, voters who favoured the Progressive Conservatives in the 2000 election split almost equally between the Liberals (22%), the Bloc (25%), and the new Conservative Party (23%). Another 9% went to the New Democrats, and about 13% abstained. By comparison, most Canadian Alliance voters in Quebec (46%) cast their votes for the new Conservative Party in 2006, although about 20% abstained. The conclusion one can draw from these numbers is that the conservative merger in Quebec had a detrimental impact on the right-of-centre vote in this province. As for the Liberals, their performance in Quebec suffered in the 2004 election primarily from losing voters to abstentions (23%). Dissatisfied Liberal voters in Quebec apparently did neither see the other federalist parties nor the separatist Bloc as viable electoral alternatives.
The electoral fortunes of the federal parties in Quebec changed dramatically in the 2006 election. The Liberal Party suffered further losses-most likely in light of the sponsorship scandal, which held particular interest in Quebec due its origin in the campaign for the Quebec referendum in October 1995. It retained only about 61% of its own voters and lost 23% to the group of non-voters, with further small losses to all other parties except for the Bloc. Nevertheless, the Bloc Québecois also lost significant shares of voters, except to the Liberals. It retained 79% of its voters. The largest losses were apparently towards abstentions, but further large losses seem to have gone to the Conservative Party. The estimates also reveal that the Conser-vative Party's vote has far from solidified in Quebec. The retention rate of 42% is very modest, with sizeable losses in all directions. Nevertheless, the electoral fortunes of the Conservative Party improved significantly through an influx of new voters. A sizeable 23% of the 2004 non-voters cast their ballots for the Conservative Party. To what extent the Conservative Party will be able to consolidate these gains will obviously have a significant impact on the next federal election. The voter migration estimates seem to indicate, nevertheless, that support for the Conservative Party in Quebec remains highly volatile. Contrary to opinions sometimes advanced in the mass media, it was not a direct flow of voter sentiment from the Liberals to the Conservatives that led to electoral gains for the Conservative Party in Quebec. Rather, the weakness of the Liberal Party led to significant abstentions, whereas the Conservative Party attracted a significant number of new voters and Bloc voters.
The estimates of voter volatility VV (equation 9) in tables 5 and 6 indicate that the vote for the Bloc Québecois is less volatile than that of any of the other parties. This is direct empirical evidence for the robustness of the support for this party, and demonstrates that most of movement in Quebec politics does not come from shifts in voter sentiment between the federalist parties and the Bloc, but rather from shifts among the federalist parties and the group of non-voters.
Conclusions
This paper has defined and applied the method of Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) estimation to the problem of backing out voter migration flows from electoral data in three recent Canadian elections. As exit polls are not common in Canada, using this macro-level approach to back out micro-level voter behaviour-a problem also known as ecological inference-sheds powerful light on electoral dynamics in Canada. The results obtained in this study will be of interest to politicians, political scientists, historians as well as econometric practicioners. Given the relative simplicity and empirical robustness of the method, voter migration analysis may perhaps become a prominent feature of electoral night reporting and analysis in Canada-as it already is in some European countries (albeit not using GME).
The electoral analysis in this papers has been able to answer interesting questions about electoral dynamics in Canada as well as the province of British Columbia. In particular, the voter flow estimates have identified some important features and stylized facts of voter behaviour. They reveal where votes have gone or come from vis-à-vis other parties and the group of non-voters. The picture that emerges is significantly more complex than the overall net gains let on; see tables 3, 5, and 6. The results clearly demonstrate the importance of transitions between voters and non-voters. Politicians may conclude from this that the low-hanging fruit of political campaigning are often found among non-voters, especially when a party is recovering from an electorally unsatisfying result in a previous election. Many voters appear to prefer abstaining from voting for their favoured party rather than switching support to a less-favoured party. Given that much electoral campaigning is directed at political adversaries rather than non-voters, the results found in this paper may give politicians pause thinking about allocating their campaign resources. Estimation of voter migration flow may help parties understand where 'their' voters went, and how to win them back.
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